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DETERMINING TIE REASONABLENESS OF
FINES IMPOSED ON UNION MEMVIBERS:
THE ROLE OF NLRB
In 1947 Congress amended section 7 of the National Labor Re-
lations Act (NLRA)1 to include the right of employees to refrain
from engaging in organizational or concerted activites.2 Congress
also added section 8(b)(1)(A),8 which prohibits any "restraint or
coercion" by a union of employees in the exercise of their section 7
rights. This provision was hedged, however, by a proviso "t]hat
. ..[section 8(b)] shall not impair the right of a labor organization
to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or reten-
tion of membership therein."4 Thus, a union rule which restricts or
forbids conduct protected by section 7 becomes an unfair labor prac-
tice unless the union can demonstrate that (1) the rule and its en-
forcement fall within the proviso, or (2) the regulation and the sanc-
tion used to enforce the union rule do not "restrain or coerce" the em-
ployee in the exercise of his section 7 rights. Since expulsion and fines
enforceable by expulsion fall within the proviso, such sanctions us-
ually do not constitute unfair labor practices.5 Further, in NLRB
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
2. Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the ex-
tent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in
section 8(a)(3)... Id. § 157 (emphasis added).
3. Section 8(b) (1) (A) provides:
(b) it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in section [7]: Provided, that this paragraph shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.
Id. § 158 (b)(1)(A).
4. Id.
5. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 198 (1967) (concurring
opinion). The NLRB has declared expulsion unlawful in limited circumstances.
See NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968); Local 138,
Int'l Union of Operating Engineers (Charles Skura), 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964). For
the prerequisites of a lawful fine, see Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430-31
(1969).
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v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.," the Supreme Court held that
fines enforced by court judgments were not within the meaning of
"restraint or coercion" covered by section 8(b)(1)(A).7
The Court in Allis-Chalmers was not presented with the issue
of whether a fine imposed pursuant to a valid union rule may never-
theless violate section 8 (b) (1) (A) because it is unreasonably large.
The NLRB and two circuit courts of appeals have considered this
question, however, and have arrived at opposite conclusions.' Ac-
6. 388 U.S. 175 (1967), noted in 32 ALBANY L. REv. 256 (1967); 20 BAYLoR
L. REv. 353 (1968); 9 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 221 (1967); 33 Mo. L. REv. 290
(1968); 29 Omo ST. L.J. 260 (1968); 21 Sw. L.J. 703 (1967); 19 SYRACUSE ULJ.
177 (1967); 36 U. Cn . L. REv. 709 (1967); 70 W. VA. L. REv. 109 (1967).
For more extensive discussions of the holding in Allis-Chalmers and its impli-
cations for union discipline, see Gould, Some Limitations Upon Union Discipline Un-
der the National Labor Relations Act: The Radiations of Allis-Chalmers, 1970
DUE L.J. 1067; Silard, Labor Board Regulation of Union Discipline After Allis-
Chalmers, Marine Workers and Scofield, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 187 (1969);
Note, Labor Policy: Judicial Enforcement of Fines After Allis-Chalmers, 53 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 1094 (1968).
7. 388 U.S. at 186-92. The Court recognized that the union rule against strike-
breaking did deter members from exercising their section 7 right to refrain from
concerted activity. However, because effective use of labor's "cherished strike wea-
pon," id. at 183, is so essential to balancing the strengths of management and la-
bor, five members of the Court were able to agree that such a fine was not the type of
"restraint or coercion" prohibited by section 8(b) (1) (A). Id. at 186-92. To reach
this conclusion the -Court observed that where a union is strong and membership
therein valuable, expulsion constitutes a greater sanction than a reasonable fine. Id.
at 192. However, a union should not, during the stressful period of a strike, be
made to choose between toleration of conduct inimical to its interests or depletion of
its ranks to enforce its rule. Thus, "there is no basis for thinking that Congress, hav-
ing accepted expulsion as a permissible technique to enforce a rule in derogation of
§ 7 rights, nevertheless intended to bar enforcement by another method which may
be far less coercive." Id. at 198 (concurring opinion). Since literal application of
the "imprecise words 'restrain or coerce " would dictate an opposite and "extra-
ordinary" result, id. at 184, the Court concluded that resort to the legislative history
to determine the meaning of the language of section 8(b) (1) (A) was not foreclosed.
From that history it was clear to the Court that the prohibition was aimed at coer-
cive union tactics employed in the course of organizational campaigns and did not
purport to regulate the internal affairs of already organized unions. Id. at 186-91.
8. 388 U.S. at 193 n.30. Accord, Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969).
Although the NLRB's General Counsel argued this issue before the trial examiner,
the issue was not passed on by the Board or the court of appeals, and was not argued
before the Court in NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Local 1029, - U.S. -, - n.8
(1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
9. Local 504, Machinists (Arrow Development Co.), 185 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 75
L.R.R.M. 1008 (1970), rev'd sub nom. O'Reilly v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 426 (9th Cir.
1972); Morton Salt Co., 190 N.L.R.B. No. 32, 77 L.R.R.M. 1100 (1971), rev'd,
472 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1972); Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists, - N.L.R.B. -,
Vol. 1973:157]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
cording to the NLRB, the amount of the fine is irrelevant to whether
its imposition constitutes an unfair labor practice. The only function
of the NLRB is to determine whether a fine is permissible in the
context of the unfair labor practice proceeding, and the task of
deciding whether the amount of the particular fine is reasonable
should be left to the state courts. 10 In Booster Lodge No. 405, Ma-
chinists v. NLRB," the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit rejected the NLRB's argument and directed the Board to
determine the reasonableness of the fine. The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to consider this question.1 2
The NLRB's argument on the irrelevancy of the amount of the
fine was best stated in Local 504, Machinists (Arrow Development
Co.)."' The Board pointed out that the Court in Allis-Chalmers
was unable to find any evidence that Congress was concerned with the
excessiveness of union fines in drafting section 8(b)(1)(A) 14 and
that the Court had concluded fines simply were not the type of coer-
cion prohibited by section 8 (b) (1) (A)." Given the holding that
Congress did not undertake to regulate union fines imposed on mem-
bers who failed to honor a picket line, the Board reasoned that
Congress could not have intended for the Board to regulate the se-
verity of the fines or establish standards with respect to their enforce-
ability.16 Further, the NLRB noted that, since the legal enforce-
- L.R.R.M. -, rev'd, 459 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3346
(U.S. Dec. 18, 1972).
10. Local 504, Machinists (Arrow Development Co.), 185 N.L.R.B. No. 22,
75 L.R.R.M. 1008, 1010-11 (1970), rev'd sub. nora., O'Reilly v. NLRB, - F.2d -
(9th Cir. 1972).
11. 459 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
12. 41 U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S., Dec. 18, 1972).
13. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 75 L.R.R.M. 1008 (1970), rev'd sub nom., O'Reilly
v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1972). See also Morton Salt Co. v. NLRB, 472
F.2d 416, 423 (9th Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion of Browning, J.).
14. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1010, citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1967).
15. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
16. Id. The Board also noted that
Where Congress desires that the Board make this type of determina-
tion, it has said so. Thus, Section 8(b)(5) of the Act authorizes the
Board to decide whether or not initiation fees charged of employees re-
quired to join a labor organization under a union-security clause are ex-
cessive and discriminatory.
Id. at 1010 n.19.
Judge Browning, dissenting in Morton Salt Co. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 416, 423 (9th
Cir. 1972), advanced a similar argument. He noted that when Congress passed
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-
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ability of fines was "grounded in contract theory,"17 the logical tri-
bunals for assessing the reasonableness of fines were the local
courts. 18  The Board claimed support for its position in the Su-
preme Court's judicial notice of the fact that "the state courts in re-
viewing the imposition of union discipline find ways to strike down
'discipline [which] involves a severe hardship.' "19 Thus, the re-
peated references to reasonable fines in Allis-Chalmers and succeed-
ing Supreme Court cases should be regarded merely as directions
to the state courts to make an independent determination of the rea-
sonableness of the particular fine sought to be enforced.20
The Booster Lodge court interpreted these references to reason-
ableness differently. Stating that the Board's position was based
upon "a clear misconception of the law and the Supreme Court's
relevant decisions,"' 21 the Booster Lodge opinion laid heavy emphasis
on the frequency with which the term "reasonable' modified "fine'
in Allis-Chalmers and in the more recent decision of Scofield v.
NLRB. 21 The court of appeals viewed the reference in Allis-ChaIm-
ers to a fine being a lesser penalty than expulsion as a clear implica-
tion that a fine's legitimacy depended on its status as a milder reme-
531 (1970), regulating internal union discipline, it vested enforcing authority in the
Department of Labor and the federal courts (preserving state remedies), but not in the
Board. 472 F.2d at 426 n.4. See LMRDA §§ 103, 603(a), id. §§ 413, 523(a).
17. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1010. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1967) (commenting on the enactment of NLRA):
"Congress was operating within the context of the 'contract theory' of the union-
member relationship which widely prevailed at that time." See also Scofield v.
NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 426 n.3 (1969) ("ERlegulation of the relationship between
union and employee is a contractual matter governed by local law"); Chafee, The In-
ternal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HAv. L. REv. 993, 1007-08 (1930).
18. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
19. Id., citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 193 n.32
(1967) (the Supreme Court had cited Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Disci-
pline, 64 HAnv. L. REv. 1049, 1078 (1951)).
20. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
21. 459 F.2d at 1156.
22. 394 U.S. 423 (1969). The word "reasonable" is frequently used in both
the Scofield and Allis-Chalmers opinions. See id. at 423, 428, 430, 436; 388 U.S. at
175, 180, 181, 183, 192. However, the references could refer to the procedures
for imposing the fines and the purposes for which the fines are imposed, as op-
posed to the amount of the fine. See Sehlossberg & Lubin, Union Fines and Union
Discipline Under the National Labor Relations Act, 23 N.Y.U. CONF. oN LABOR 207,
216-18 (1971). It is interesting to note that in NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd.,
Local 1029, - U.S. - (1972), the most recent Supreme Court case dealing with
the enforceability of union fines, the majority and concurring opinions do not
speak of reasonable fines at all. The longer dissent barely mentions reasonable-
ness. Id. at -.
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dy.23 Thus a harsh fine, which is more severe than expulsion,
would be an unfair labor practice.2 4 Since according to Booster
Lodge an excessive fine violates sections 8(b) (1) (A), the Board's
duty to examine the reasonableness of fines was clear; 25 the fact that
"'state courts have been adjudicating internal union disputes for
more than 60 years' "26 did not relieve the Board of its duty to ad-
judicate and remedy unfair labor practices.
The Booster Lodge opinion buttressed its legal arguments with
a discussion of policy reasons that favor NLRB review of the rea-
sonableness of union fines. Requiring the NLRB to adjudicate the
reasonableness of fines would promote promulgation of uniform na-
tional labor standards.27  Further, because the expenses of litiga-
tion before the Board are borne by the agency, a union member is
less likely to be dissuaded from the exercise of his rights by the costs
of litigation in the state courts.28 The D.C. Circuit indicated that the
Board's experience in the related area of determining reasonableness
of initiation fees would be helpful in making similar decisions with re-
spect to fines.29  The Board's assertion, that to require it to deter-
23. 459 F.2d at 1156, citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175,
191-92 (1967).
24. Id.
25. Section 10(a) of the NLRA provides:
The Board is empowered, ...to prevent any person from engaging in any
unfair labor practice (listed in section 158 of this title) affecting com-
merce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjust-
ment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement,
law, or otherwise. . . . 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
This section is, of course, only a grant of power, not a command. However, the
Supreme Court has held that, with some exceptions, the NLRB's jurisdiction to de-
cide issues involving sections 7 or 8 is plenary. See, e.g., San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See notes 31-33 infra and ac-
companying text.
26. 459 F.2d at 1157, quoting Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What
the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175 (1960).
27. 459 F.2d at 1158. The NLRB, of course, has some possible policy argu-
ments as well. Potential responsibility for examining the reasonableness of all fines
is a frightening prospect to a Board which is already worried about its work load.
See Fanning, Can We Make the NLRB Work More Effectively?, 23 N.Y.U. CONF. ON
LABOR 101 (1971). The Board may also be concerned lest it appear to unions to be
a hostile policeman rather than a trustworthy and neutral arbiter. See Silard, La-
bor Board Regulation of Union Discipline After Allis-Chalmers, Marine Workers and
Scofield, 38 Gno. WASH. L. RPv. 187, 197-98 (1969).
28. 459 F.2d at 1158, citing Summers, supra note 26, at 220.
29. 459 F.2d at 1158. Section 8(b)(5) directs the NLRB in determining the
reasonableness of initiation fees, to
consider, among other relevant factors, the practices and customs of la-
bor organizations in the particular industry, and the wages currently paid
to the employees affected. . .. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(5) (1970).
332
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mine the reasonableness of fines might result in conflicts between
the NLRB and state courts, was brushed aside as not detracting from
the Board's statutory obligations. 0
It is unlikely that this last point will receive so abrupt a treat-
ment in the Supreme Court, since a decision upholding the appellate
court in Booster Lodge would raise significant preemption problems.31
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,32 the Supreme
Court held that labor controversies involving conduct arguably pro-
tected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8 of the NLRA were
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.3" Thus, if a fine
can become an unfair labor practice because of its size, the fine is
arguably prohibited by section 8 of the Act pending an adjudication
of its reasonableness by the NLRB. Absent such a determination by
the Board, the state courts would have no jurisdiction to grant or deny
enforcement. 34 Moreover, since there is no procedure whereby
unions can get advisory opinions on possible section 8 violations,35
For an example of such determinations, see Local 1419, Int'l Longshoremen Ass'n,
186 N.L.R.B. No. 94, 75 L.R.R.M. 1411 (1970). Cf. NLRB v. Engineers Local
1212, 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
30. 459 F.2d at 1157.
31. For a discussion of preemption as it relates to the issue before the Court in
Booster Lodge, see Gould, Some Limitations, supra note 6, at 1132-36. For discus-
sions of preemption in the field of labor-management relations, see VI THE DE-
VELOPING LABOR LAW 785-94 (C. Morris ed. 1971); Broomfield, Preemptive Federal
Jurisdiction Over Concerted Trespassory Union Activity, 83 HARv. L. REv. 552
(1970); Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Prob-
lems in the Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L. Rnv. 1435 (1970); Cox, Labor Law
Preemption Revisited, 85 HtAv. L. REv. 1337 (1972); Gould, The Garmon Case:
The Decline and Threshold of "Litigating Elucidation," 39 U. DET. L.J. 539 (1962);
Isaacson, Federal Pre-emption Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 IND. & LAB. REL. Ruv.
391 (1958); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of
Garmon, 72 CoLUM. L. REv. 469 (1972); Michelman, State Power To Govern Con-
certed Employee Activities, 74 Hnv. L. REV. 641 (1961).
32. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
33. Id. at 244.
34. Gould, Some Limitations, supra note 6, at 1135.
35. Although the NLRB does not currently issue declaratory orders in unfair
labor practice proceedings, it appears to have power to do so. The NLRA provides
that the Board shall have "authority . . . to make, amend, and rescind, in the
manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the provisions" of the NLRA. NLRA § 6, 29
U.S.C. § 156 (1970). The APA permits agencies to issue declaratory orders to
"terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty." 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1970). The
Board already issues such orders in jurisdictional disputes. 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.105-
.110 (1972). See generally Hickey, Declaratory Orders and the National Labor Re-
lations Board, 45 NoTRe DAME LAWYER 89 (1969); Note, State Regulation of Un-
protected Union Activity: Bypassing the "Arguably Subject" Test with NLRB
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the state courts could not get jurisdiction to enforce a fine unless the
employee or his employer previously had challenged its legality be-
fore the Board.36 But there would be little reason for a disciplined
union member so to cooperate with the union in its efforts to collect
the fine. Therefore, unless the Supreme Court reconsiders or makes
exceptions to the Garmon doctrine, a decision affirming Booster
Lodge could have the practical effect of nullifying the decision in Al-
lis-Chalmers.
The alternatives open to the Court in reviewing Booster Lodge
are clear. It could, of course, agree with the Board that reasonable-
ness of amount is irrelevant to the question of whether a particular
fine violates section 8 (b) (1) (A) . 7  But the chief arguments of the
NLRB-lack of a specific congressional directive, and a narrow
reading of Allis-Chalmers3S-seem weak compared to the array of
legal and policy reasons advanced by Booster Lodge for NLRB re-
view of reasonableness. 39 On the other hand, a decision which could
leave unions without a remedy sanctioned by a previous Supreme
Court decision is clearly unacceptable.40 Some of the Court's prior
preemption decisions have drawn fire from legislators, 41 commenta-
tors42 and four members of the present Court,43 and the Court could
Advisory Opinions, 70 YALE L.J. 441 (1961). The use of such orders has the appar-
ent support of at least two members of the present Court. See Amalgamated Ass'n
of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 328 n.6 (1971) (dissenting opin-
ion of Burger, C.J., & White, 3.).
36. See Gould, Some Limitations, supra note 6, at 1135. Compare Axnalga-
mated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), where the
failure of the member to file an unfair labor practice charge with the Board barred
him from relief in the state courts by a strict interpretation of Garmon.
37. See text accompanying notes 13-20 supra.
38. See text accompanying notes 13-20 supra.
39. See text accompanying notes 21-30 supra.
40. This assertion is particularly true where, as here, the party is denied even
a forum in which to present his case. See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
41. For example, the decision in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1
(1957) (requiring preemption where the Board has declined to exercise jurisdiction
but has not ceded jurisdiction to a state agency) was accused of creating "a no man's
land, in which there are grievous wrongs and no remedy under American jurispru-
dence as of this time." 105 CoNG. Rac. 6413 (1959) (remarks of Senator McClel-
lan). Guss was further characterized as "a stench in the nostrils of justice." Id. at
6544 (remarks of Senator Ervin).
Congress moved swiftly to fill the "chasm created by Guss," id. at 6430 (re-
marks by Senator Goldwater), by enacting section 14(c) to the NLRA, requiring
the NLRB to exercise jurisdiction over all labor disputes which met jurisdictional
standards prevailing on August 1, 1959. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1970).
42. See Come, supra note 31, at 1437-40; Cox, supra note 31, at 1359-68;
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use the Booster Lodge case as an opportunity to reassess the doc-
trine. 44 Alternatively, the Court could attempt to fit the concurrent
right of state courts to determine reasonableness into one of the
many exceptions which, according to one Justice, have left "the 'rule'
of uniformity . . . a tattered one."45  A goal of both Booster
Lodge and the preemption cases is the furtherance of a coherent na-
tional labor policy.40 An equally important objective is that of af-
fording unions a realistic remedy for the rights granted by Allis-
Chalmers.
Gould, The Garmon Case, supra note 31, at 558-69; Isaacson, supra note 31, at 396-
97; Michelman, supra note 31, at 645-48.
43. Both Justices Douglas and White dissented on the preemption issue in Amal-
gamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 318 (1972). Chief
Justice Burger joined in Justice White's dissent. Id. at 319. Justice Blackmun agreed
with both dissents. Id. at 332. Two members of the majority in Lockridge, Justices
Harlan and Black, are deceased. Significantly, all four dissenting justices agreed that
the preemption doctrine should not be allowed to leave a party to a labor dispute
without an effective remedy. Id. at 303-05, 327-32. The Lockridge dissenters also
agreed that the doctrine of preemption should not apply to member-union controver-
sies. Id. at 305, 320-25.
44. A strict application of the preemption doctrine also works mischief in cases
where an employer seeks to enjoin peaceful picketing. If the picketing does not
violate section 8, he cannot bring an unfair labor practice charge against the union.
But since the picketing may be protected activity under section 7, a state court has
no jurisdiction to hear a trespass case. Thus, the employer's only remedy is to ex-
pel the pickets and risk being charged with an unfair labor practice. For a dis-
cussion of other problems with preemption, see Come, supra note 31. The Court
could handle the preemption issue in Booster Lodge simply by holding that controver-
sies between unions and their members are not within the preemption doctrine. See
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). See also note 43
supra. A better course would be to fill all the lacunae created by Garmon by holding
that preemption is inapplicable in all cases where it would deny a party an effec-
tive remedy.
45. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 318
(1971) (dissenting opinion of White, J.). For the argument that enforcement of
union fines may be excepted from a strict reading of Garmon because of the strong
local interest and tradition of state court jurisdiction, see Gould, supra note 6, at
1133-34. For examples of other exceptions to the preemption doctrine, see Justice
White's dissent in Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 310-19.
46. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274,
285-89 (1971); Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143, 1158
(1972).
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